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Abstract Disclosure of income, assets and conflicts of interest can serve as powerful public
accountability tools to draw attention to the abuse of public office, help prosecute corrupt
offenders and create a culture of scrutiny in the public sector that deters corruption. Based on
data of the World Bank’s Public Accountability Mechanisms initiative, we present the first
indicator that captures a country’s financial disclosure in-law effort. By employing different
panel data model specifications, we use this indicator to measure how the introduction of
comprehensive financial disclosure systems impacted national corruption levels for 91 coun-
tries between 1996 and 2012. We present robust results that provide tentative evidence for a
positive and significant relationship between a country’s capacity to control for corruption and
the expansion of financial disclosure legislation for the years following the enactment.
Keywords Corruption . Control of Corruption . Public Accountability . Financial Disclosure .
Actionable Governance Indicators
Introduction
It came as a shock for the Vietnamese anticorruption community when, in 2014, the former
government chief inspector Tran Van Truyen, once a leading figure in the national fight against
corruption, was prosecuted for abusing his office to personally enrich himself and his family. His
income and asset declarations revealed that he had used his position as a public official to appropriate
real estate worth US$10 million—a grave inconsistency for a person with a salary of a Vietnamese
public official. Cases like this are relatively common across all levels of the public sector, which
shows that disclosure requirements for income, assets and conflicts of interest can serve as powerful
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public accountability tools to help prosecute corrupt public officials and to create a culture of
scrutiny in the public sector. It is for these reasons that over the last 20 years increasingly more
international conventions urge countries to introduce laws and regulations on financial disclosure
(FD) into their national legislation. These laws and regulations define which public officials have to
disclose information, what they have to disclose, how often this has to be done, how verification of
the disclosed information is ensured, how noncompliance is sanctioned and how much of the
information is publicly available. However, despite their prominence, there is surprisingly little
evidence on the true effectiveness of FD legislation on combating corruption. This is especially true
for quantitative research. To make a contribution to closing the evidence gap and to answer the
question of whether FD systems can serve as instruments to decrease national corruption levels, this
paper introduces the first index that captures a country’s FD in-law effort.
The paper is structured as follows: The first section explains the logic and ideal constitution of FD
systems as a public accountability and anticorruption instrument. The second section is dedicated to
the construction of the very first index that captures countries’ FD in-law efforts, followed in section
three by the first descriptive analysis of its development over time. In section four, we introduce an
equilibriummodel that helps to better conceptualise the nature of anticorruption instruments, such as
FD legislation. This, in turn, informs the setup of the subsequent empirical model. Section five
describes the employed data. Section six focuses on results of a panel fixed-effects model, which
tests whether the existence of FD systems has an impact on corruption levels and discusses some
limitations of the model. Section seven concludes the paper.
Analysing the indicators for FD in-law efforts, we observe that between 1996 and 2012 almost all
countries in the sample experienced a sharp increase in FD laws and regulations independent of their
level of development or region. The panel fixed-effects model indicates that FD systems have a
lagged, positive effect on countries’ ability to control for corruption after their enactment.
Power of Public Accountability: Financial Disclosure Systems
as Anticorruption Instruments
In the late 1980s, corruption, understood as Bthe abuse of public office for private gain^ (Kaufmann
1997: 114), found its way into public discourse when a massive wave of corruption scandals swept
across modern Western democracies. Within a short period of time, this led to a number of
international initiatives to combat corruption, which included the cooperation of international
organisations, governments, civil society and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) (De Sousa
2010). Surprisingly, despite the popularity of anticorruption interventions,1 very little is known about
their effectiveness (Johnsøn et al. 2012; Hanna et al. 2011). This is also true for FD systems that have
evolved into a widely promoted anticorruption instrument since the mid-1990s (OECD 2011).
FD systems can be considered one element of public accountability, which in turn is understood
as a mechanism ensuring that public officials in positions with power can Bbe held accountable in
public for their acts and omissions, for their decisions, their policies, and their expenditures^
(Bovens 2005: 182). The public can be an individual person or agency but can also include the
electorate or entire population (ibid.). According to Bovens (2005), public accountability serves
three purposes: first, to uphold democratic control; second, to improve performance in the public
sector through institutional learning; and third and most importantly, to enhance integrity in public
governance as a mechanism to control for corruption, abuse of power or nepotism. The latter
1 For a detailed discussion of the different types of anticorruption interventions, see Johnsøn et al. (2012).
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function of public accountability is significantly enhanced by national FD systems. These systems
entail laws and regulations that regulate the disclosure of the most important aspects of public
officials’ financial background, especially with regard to their income, assets and potential conflicts
of interest arising from their particular positions (World Bank 2012). This way, FD systems are
intended to help monitor public officials’ financial situations in order to increase transparency and
accountability and thus deter corrupt interactions (Messick 2009).
According to the World Bank (WB), a FD system must comprise four complementary
elements in order to be fully functional. The scope is understood as a definition of the items
that must be disclosed, which public officials and those directly related to them are required to
disclose and how often they must perform this duty. The second element is a monitoring
regime that enables authorities to screen compliance with the submission of such disclosure
statements and to verify their content. This must go hand in hand with the third element: a
framework that allows for the enforcement of predefined sanctions in case of noncompliance
with the filing regulations. The last element of a comprehensive FD system is the public
availability of certain aspects of the disclosed information. This allows civil society and the
public to join monitoring efforts and increases the credibility of the threat that public officials’
abuse of office will be detected (Mukherjee and Gokcekus 2006).
FD systems are always country specific and serve two purposes. First, they aim to prevent
the abuse of public office for private gain. For this purpose, FD systems need to clearly define
potential conflicts of interests for public officials and establish guidelines of what situations to
avoid, while reminding those officials that their behaviour is scrutinised and that credible
prosecution threats exist. Second, FD systems must help detect violations and therefore help
enforce anticorruption laws. If these two functions are properly fulfilled, FD systems can
contribute to the emergence of a climate of integrity in the public administration and conse-
quently decrease corruption in the long run (Burdescu et al. 2010a; WB 2012).
Likely owing to the holistic nature of FD systems, there is barely any research on its impact on
national corruption levels. In the qualitative literature, one can distinguish between three types of
publications on the topic: first, there are a small number of publications that give practical
recommendations as to how to implement such systems and discuss related difficulties (Messick
2009; Burdescu et al. 2010a, 2010b; OECD 2011; WB 2012). Second, there are studies that
exclusively focus on single elements of FD systems, such as conflict of interest (COI) regulations
(Demmke et al. 2008) or public availability of information (Bauhr and Grimes 2014; WB 2012).
Lastly, some authors concentrate on country case studies of FD systems (Vickerman 2009; WB
2013a). However, the extrapolation of their results to other countries remains questionable.
A somewhat similar situation can be observed when turning to quantitative research on the
effectiveness of anticorruption laws and FD systems. In their metastudy on anticorruption
interventions, Johnsøn et al. note that only a few studies Bprovided an impact assessment of an
anticorruption law^ (2012: 13). However, a small number of studies have addressed the
effectiveness of single elements of FD systems on corruption. Djankov et al. (2010) evaluate
the correlation between the implementation of disclosure laws for members of parliament (MP)
and governance. Tavares (2007) and Islam (2006), on the other hand, tested whether freedom
of information (FOI) laws can help decrease corruption. However, the authors obtained mixed
results regarding the correlation of FOI laws and corruption levels.
In sum, it becomes apparent that a holistic approach to capture the impact of FD systems on
national corruption levels is missing. Therefore, this study is intended to contribute to filling
this research gap. In line with the notion of FD systems as a pillar of public accountability, we
assume that their transparency and accountability-enhancing nature contributes to a reduction
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of corruption. Accordingly, our general hypothesis is as follows: The introduction of compre-
hensive financial disclosure regulation reduces national corruption levels.
Constructing an Index to Capture a Country’s Financial Disclosure In-law
Efforts
Literature dedicated to the construction and criticism of indices that attempt to capture corruption is
extensive. However, attempts to construct indices that measure a country’s anticorruption effort are
scant at best. Very few authors have attempted to quantify anticorruption policies to allow for a
cross-country analysis. Rousso and Steves (2007), for example, constructed an anticorruption
intensity index that attempts to measure the extent and quality of a government’s anticorruption
activities based on the three dimensions: (i) integrated anticorruption programs, (ii) enactment of
legislation, reducing incentives for corruption, and (iii) membership in international anticorruption
coalitions and adoption of international anticorruption covenants. Each of these dimensions carries
equal weight in the final index and is evaluated according to a number of subindicators that capture
their comprehensiveness and to a lesser extent their quality. Using a cross-sectional model for 26
post-Communist transition countries, the authors examined the relationship between anticorruption
intensity index scores and its dimensions and various lagged measures of corruption levels.
However, they do not find a statistically significant correlation. Despite the merits of the
comprehensive nature of their index, the unavailability of panel data and the small number of
observations reduce the value of their index for research. In a less comprehensive way, Anderson
and Gray (2006) look at the anticorruption effect of simplifying countries’ tax policies. For that
purpose, they use single elements of the Paying Taxes indicator, which is one of the WB’s Doing
Business indicators, and evaluate them against the frequency of bribes related to tax payments in
post-Communist transition countries. In a cross-section analysis, they find a positive effect of
decreasing the number of tax payments. However, this effect disappears once controlling for other
relevant variables. Once more, the lack of a large sample and panel data considerably limits the
applicability of their approach.
In order to address these shortcomings and advance the body of research around the attempts to
make anticorruption policies measurable, while also scrutinising their true effect on corruption, we
constructed an indicator that captures a country’s FD in-law effort. For this purpose, we drew on the
WB’s Public Accountability Mechanism (PAM) data, which represents the most comprehensive
collection of cross-country information on constitutional requirements, laws and codes of ethics
regulating financial disclosure for public officials. The PAM initiativewas launched in 2010with the
goal to Bprovide timely information and assistance to WB operational teams working on transpar-
ency and accountability issues^ (WB 2013b: 2), with a particular focus on the fight against
corruption in the public sector. For this purpose, the initiative provides freely accessible information
on laws and other types of regulation that aim to enhance transparency and accountability in the
public sector. The data set covers 91 countries across all continents, although some regions are more
represented than others.2 Graph 1 presents the country coverage of the WB’s PAM initiative.3
Each PAM data set is based on a number of so-called Actionable Governance Indicators (AGI).
AGIs were developed by the WB to measure narrowly defined subelements of governance, as
opposed to broad categories, such as rule of law, that are often difficult to quantify. This way, AGIs
2 See Graph 16 in BAppendix 1^ for the PAM coverage of regional groups.
3 See BAppendix 2^ for the list of the countries covered by the PAM initiative.
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provide manageable information that can guide the actions of governments engaged in governance
reforms (WB 2013b; see also Reid 2009). In the case of the PAM data set for FD, the AGIs capture
the institutional arrangements or in-law efforts of a country to boost accountability and thus fight
corruption by providing a discrete assessment (a simple yes or no response) of the existence of a
specific FD law or regulation codified in a country’s legal framework. In addition, data includes
information on the precise enactment date. A particularAGIwould, for instance, contain information
on whether a country has a clearly defined regulation that obligates public servants to declare gifts
they have received and when this regulation was enacted. Each country-data set entails the same
structure and includes information on 174 AGIs, which allows for systematic cross-country
comparisons.
Looking at data for FD, AGIs represent the most disaggregated data level. The first aggregation
level is given by the type of public officials that are covered by the particular law or regulation
captured by the AGI. This includes the categories head of state, ministers and cabinet members,
members of the parliament, civil servants and spouses and children. The next higher aggregation
level is given by the five components of FD systems introduced in section 1 above. These are
disclosure items, filing frequency, sanctions, monitoring and oversight and public access to
declarations. An illustration of the structure and hierarchy of the FD-PAM is given in Graph 2.4
In order to convert this qualitative data set into a systematic, numerical indicator that
captures countries’ FD in-law efforts, we followed three steps:
1. Values of 0 and 1 were assigned to all AGIs for each country. 1 was assigned when the
indicator showed a "yes" (laws or regulations enacted) and 0 if otherwise. In addition,
since AGIs also include information on the precise enactment date of the law or regula-
tion, values of 0 and 1 were assigned under a time dimension up until 2012. Accordingly,
prior to the enactment of a particular law, the assigned value is 0, the year the law was
enacted, and in all of the following years the value is 1.
2. The second step consisted of aggregating the AGI up to the first aggregation level for
every year. For this step, no a priori assumption was made regarding the relevance of
specific AGIs for measuring the in-law efforts of the FD system. Thus, equal weight was
attached to each of the 174 AGIs.
3. The last step consisted of aggregating the values from the second aggregation level to the
PAM Financial Disclosure level. For defining weights, we applied a simple version of the
item response theory, also called latent trait theory. Coming from psychometrics, this
method does not assume the same difficulty across all items and thereby helps differentiate
the loading of items into an indicator (DeMars 2010).5
The rationale behind the third step is that the enactment of a certain set of FD laws and
regulations seems to be more politically challenging in comparison with other FD laws and
4 The Income and Asset Disclosure AGI is followed by an additional aggregation level after the AGI level. This
category is structured as follows: a. Income and assets, b. Business activities and c. Public office mandate.
5 Weights for each of the five FD components on the second aggregation level were calculated by using the mean of the
number of laws and regulations in place for this particular component across the entire sample, that is, across all countries
and years. The values were then put into relation to the theoretical benchmark of Bhaving all laws and regulations of this
FD component in place,^ resulting in values between 0 and 1. Following the rational that a lower number of laws and
regulations within a particular component indicate a higher anticorruption effect of this component (as elaborated above),
the calculated mean values had to be inverted so that the component featuring the lowest density of laws and regulations
gets the largest weight. This was done by subtracting 1 and then multiplying by −1. Lastly, the latter calculated values
were used proportionally as weights for aggregating the FD components into our country FD in-law effort indicator.
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regulations. We derive this assumption from the observation that across countries, there is a
systematically higher density of laws and regulations for certain FD categories, such as
monitoring and oversight, whereas other categories, such as public access to declarations are
much less regulated. This pattern might be explained by the fact that FD laws and regulations
must be designed, enacted and executed by the same set of public officials who are supposed
to be scrutinised by them. Accordingly, it seems plausible that public officials might resist the
Graph 1 Country coverage. Countries included in the World Bank's PAM initiative. Source: Own graph. Map
constructed using www.amcharts.com
Graph 2 Structure and hierarchy of the financial disclosure Public Accountability Mechanism (PAM). Source:
Own graph. Based on the PAM iniative data set
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enactment of certain FD laws and regulations that drastically increase transparency, such as
public access to declarations while accepting the enactment of FD elements that are less
scrutinising. Following this assumption, we conclude that those FD laws and regulations that
show a significantly lower enactment density across countries have a stronger anticorruption
effect and will thus receive a larger weight in the indicator.6
As mentioned previously, the result of this approach is a continuous indicator that captures
the FD in-law effort from all five elements of an FD system. Values of the indicator range from
0 to 1, where a country scores the value of 0 when no FD regulation is in place. Conversely, a
country scores the value of 1 when laws and regulations in place cover every element of an FD
system as defined by the WB’s PAM framework.
Evolution of Financial Disclosure In-law Efforts from 1996 to 2012
FD regulation has greatly expanded in recent years. This expansion has occurred across all
country income groups, as can be seen in Graph 3. In 1996, high-income countries showed the
largest FD in-law efforts, whereas the upper-middle, lower-middle and low-income countries
had similarly low levels. By 2012, high-income countries remained as the leading group
amongst the different groups of countries, with low-income countries coming in last.
From a different perspective, FD regulation has also increased considerably across different
regions. As can be seen in Graph 4, all regions in the world increased their FD in-law efforts
since the 1990s. By 2012, Eastern Europe and Central Asia were the leading regions.
Conversely, by 2012 Sub-Saharan Africa was the region with the lowest FD in-law efforts.
Interestingly, the advanced economies group7 did not increase their FD in-law efforts as
rapidly as countries from other regions, and by the end of the period, this region was already
falling behind Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. This result
stands in contrast to the results from grouping the countries by income, where high-income
countries showed the biggest FD in-law efforts. This suggests that new high-income countries
located mainly in Eastern Europe are the main drivers of this progress.
When sorting countries in the high-income group by gross national income (GNI) per capita
purchasing power parity (PPP), we confirm that the largest contribution to the change in FD in-
law effort within this group stems from the new high-income countries, geographically located
in Eastern Europe (see Graph 5). According to Demmke et al. (2008), regulation density differs
considerably among European Union (EU) member countries, with new member states having
generally more regulation than older members do. This finding is in line with findings of the
WB, pointing out that: Bgenerally, countries with longer traditions of professionalisation in the
civil service have narrower disclosure requirements and design their disclosure mechanisms to
focus on the prevention of conflicts of interest^ (2012: 9). Furthermore, this fact may be a
reflection of fairly well-institutionalised codes of ethics and other monitoring and oversight
mechanisms for public office holders in traditionally high-income (advanced) economies (ibid.).
6 Values we obtain deviate only slightly from the simple average method. As a robustness check, we tested our
explanatory variable calculated with simpler averages on the empirical models introduced in the next section,
since we wanted to check whether using a more elaborated version of our explanatory variable would have
modified significantly our results. We observed no change in terms of sign and significance of the estimated
coefficients of our explanatory variable.
7 France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom, United States and Taiwan.
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As mentioned previously, FD regulation can be disaggregated into five lower-level com-




4. Monitoring and oversight
5. Public access to declarations
As an analytical exercise, it is relevant to check whether there were particular or atypical
changes in specific FD regulation components between 1996 and 2012 or whether increases
occurred evenly across all of them. As can be seen in Graph 6, it seems that there is no
particular trend for individual components, either in one specific FD regulation component or
in a particular group of countries. However, two aspects are interesting to note regardless of a
Graph 3 Financial disclosure in-law efforts by income groups (2012 World Bank classification), 1996-2012.
Source: Own calculations
Graph 4 Financial disclosure in-law efforts by world regions (2012 World Bank classification), 1996-2012.
Source: Own calculations
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generalised increase in FD in-law efforts: disclosure items and public access to declarations
remain considerably lower for all country groups when compared with the remaining compo-
nents. This finding shows how these two components of an FD system may meet more
political resistance against their enactment, presumably due to their stronger anticorruption
effect by allowing better scrutiny of public officials while making credible prosecution threats
and increasing accountability towards the public.
With results categorised by level of political officer, it seems that there is no particular or
atypical increase in any of the five components of an FD system. As can be seen in Graphs 7–
11, for all country groups and all aspects of regulation, FD in-law effort has increased
analogously. Assuming FD regulation for civil servants captures FD in-law efforts against
petty corruption, and that FD regulation for all the other public officers measures in-law efforts
against grand corruption, it is possible to discard the assumption that, in general, FD in-law
efforts are focused on explicitly tackling a specific type of corruption (grand or petty).
Graph 6 In-law efforts by financial disclosure items by income groups (2012 World Bank classification), 1996,
2012. Source: Own calculations
Graph 5 Financial disclosure in-law efforts by income groups (2012 World Bank classification), 1996, 2012.
Source: Own calculations
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Finally, it is interesting to note thatmost countries in our sample have expanded their FD systems,
whereas very few economies have actually experienced improvements in combating corruption as
measured by the WB’s Control of Corruption (COC) Governance Indicator. As can be seen in
Graphs 12 and 13, only 33 countries experienced positive changes in COC between 1996 and 2012.
This finding confirms the multifaceted and rather complex nature of COC and shows how
corruption is explained by many other determinants.
A Model to Capture Corruption: of Vicious Equilibria
Today’s conceptualisation of corruption is strongly influenced by the assumption that modern states
are characterised by a rational legal system with institutionalised governance rules that draw a clear
line between private and public dimensions (Ledeneva 2013). Klitgaard’s influential principal-agent
model, introduced in 1988, centres around the same principle. According to this model, modern
states feature numerous principal-agent relationships, where the citizens or their government are the
principals and public servants are the agents. The principal assigns the agent certain duties and
transfers the respective responsibilities, resources and discretion to them. However, this transfer
gives the agent an informational advantage that gives room for corrupt transactions and thus the
Graph 7 Disclosure items by level of political officer and income groups, 1996, 2012. Source: Own calculations
Graph 8 Filling frequency by level of political officer and income groups, 1996, 2012. Source: Own calculations
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breach of the public–private dichotomy (1988; see also Kaufmann et al. 2002; Besley 2007). Today,
the principal-agent model informs most contributions in corruption research as well as the design of
most of today’s anticorruption interventions (Persson et al. 2013; Ugur and Dasgupta 2011).
However, a growing number of authors raise questions about some of the model’s main
assumptions, rejecting the notion of a clear dividing line between the private and the public realm
when defining corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011; Persson et al. 2013).
Persson et al. (2013), for example, argue that people’s willingness to control corruption depends
on people’s expectation of howmany individuals in their society are corrupt. If the majority expects
corrupt behaviour to be the widespread norm, deviating from this norm will be too costly for an
individual in the short term, even though it might be benefit maximising for all individuals in the
society in the long run. Accordingly, reforms targeted at strengthening monitoring and increasing
punishment will be ineffective, as the principals will lack the incentives to enforce them, or in other
words, to be a principled principal. It is only through collective action, where many actors deviate
simultaneously from the corrupt equilibrium, that a new equilibrium can be reached and endemic
corruption tamed (ibid.).8
In a similar manner, Mungiu-Pippidi et al. argue for a holistic conceptualisation of corruption,
locating it in a Bbroader social order framework^ (2011: 35). In order to express this broader
understanding, Mungiu-Pippidi et al. (2014) uses the terms ‘particularism’ and ‘ethical universal-
ism’. She defines these terms by describing a continuum of governance order with equal and fair
treatment of every citizen (ethical universalism) at one end of the continuum, and favoritism and
corruption (particularism) at the other. The author stresses that the nature of the state cannot differ
from the society in which it is embedded. Particularism is not only perpetuated by those who have
access to power resources but also by the weaker members of society, who also resort to corruption
as a means of defending themselves against state exploitation (ibid; Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2014).
According toMungiu-Pippidi et al. (2011), only a limited number of societies have managed to part
from that natural state and develop universal systems. Thus, particularism is Bnot a social ‘malady’,
as corruption is usually described, but a state of default equilibrium, natural^ (ibid: 25). The powerful
implication from this perspective on corruption is that anticorruption efforts are not understood as
8 For Mungiu-Pippidi et al. (2011) the change of equilibria to the better can be a lengthy social evolution process
in which many countries get stuck in transition, whereas Rothstein (2011) sees the only opportunity of a change
in equilibria through a BBig Bang approach that brings about radical changes in a short time period.
Graph 9 Sanctions by level of political officer and income groups, 1996, 2012. Source: Own calculations
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serving the purpose of restoring the natural, noncorrupt state. In fact, they are supposed to perform a
much more tedious task: making the unnatural a reality.
Thus, Mungiu-Pippidi et al. (2014) proposes a so-called equilibrium model that conceptualises
corruption as the outcome of a situation in which a society’s constraints are not strong enough to
prevent the abuse of public resources. Her model measures Bthe collective capacity to enforce
governance based on ethical universalism^ (ibid.: 49). Borrowing fromMungiu-Pippidi et al. (2011,
2014), who understand COC as the antithesis of corruption, we present the following equation to
conceptualise COC:
Control of Corruption ¼ f Opportunities;Constraintsð Þ
In this logic, the level of COC in a society is the result of equilibrium in available opportunities to
exploit society’s resources and constraints upheld by strong institutions and the citizenry. Accord-
ingly, opportunities are negatively and constraints positively correlated with COC. Describing the
opportunities, Mungiu-Pippidi et al. (2011, 2014) summarise two complementary elements. First,
the discretionary power resources, which include factors that increase public officials’ political and
economic discretion of power. Second, the availability of material resources, conceptualised as all
Graph 10 Monitoring and oversight by level of political officer and income groups, 1996, 2012. Source: Own
calculations
Graph 11 Public access to declarations by level of political officer and income groups, 1996, 2012. Source:
Own calculations
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sources that offer the opportunity to extract rents or spoils, such as natural resources, state assets and
also foreign aid. Conversely, the constraints entail a legal, as well as a normative, dimension. Legal
constraints are based on the strength of the judiciary, the body of laws and the institutions that
enforce them. The normative constraints, understood as constraints upheld by the citizenry, depend
on whether universalism is the prevailing social norm and whether society has the necessary
collective action capacities to enforce it. This is heavily dependent on the level of education and
material security. Graph 14 summarises the model’s underlying logic.
Given that our empirical analysis focuses on the country level, we believe that the equilibrium
model will provide us with a more useful perspective to capture changes in COC. Accordingly, the
equilibrium model will serve as conceptual framework for our empirical approach.
Data Description
The FD in-law effort indicatorwill serve as the explanatory variable for our empiricalmodel. For our
dependent variable, we chose the WB’s composite COC indicator that captures national corruption
levels, or more precisely, Bthe extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private
interests^ (Kaufmann et al. 2006: 4). 9 Grand corruption takes place within the highest level of
political leadership, such as heads of state, ministers, or other top officials who exploit their influence
and power to serve their private interests (Andvig et al. 2000). Conversely, petty corruption involves
low- andmid-level officials who demand rewards for granting access to or expediting the delivery of
a public service (e.g. licenses, official documents, etc.) or delivering services that normally are not
available (ibid.). The indicator covers 215 countries over a period from 1996 to 2013, with biannual
values from 1996 to 2002 (WB 2013c).10 In order to increase the number of observations, we
extrapolated the missing values between 1996 and 2002 by taking the mean of the previous and the
following years.11 To test the robustness of our results, we also ran our model with the Heritage
9 For a detailed description of this indicator’s methodology, refer to Kaufmann et al. (2006). For criticism of the
indicator, refer to Langbein and Knack (2010) and Brewer et al. (2007).
10 Given the availability of our explanatory and dependent variables, our sample ranges from 1996 to 2012.
11 We believe this is a valid approach, since the values for COC vary very little from year to year. As a robustness
check, we decided to run our empirical models without the imputed values. We found that some variables,
including our explanatory variable, lose significance. This may be partly explained by the decrease in the number
of observations of the sample.
Graph 12 Financial disclosure in-law efforts by country, 1996, 2012. Source: Own calculations
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Foundation’s Freedom from Corruption (FFC) indicator, which strongly resembles an extended
version of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI).12
With regard to control variables, the model orients towards the literature on corruption,
which suggests a considerable number of different determinants of corruption that have already
been analysed to various degrees of depth and methodological soundness.13 A useful classi-
fication of the vast number of corruption determinants is presented by Mungiu-Pippidi et al.,
who differentiate between those determinants that Bcan be affected by human agency^
(Mungiu-Pippidi et al. 2011: 27) and those that represent path-dependent factors that are
embedded in a society’s history and culture and can thus hardly be altered. Given the policy
orientation of the question as to whether FD laws and regulations have an impact on corruption
levels, we limit our analysis to the former, which can be divided into macroeconomic,
socioeconomic and polity and governance determinants.14
The inclusion of all corruption determinants that fall into these classifications can poten-
tially cause several methodological problems when performing a quantitative analysis. First,
since some of these determinants are highly correlated, there is a risk that analysing them
together might generate a multicollinearity problem that would result in underestimating the
findings’ levels of significance. However, as pointed out by Seldadyo and de Haan (2006),
some variables that represent a particular phenomenon can be clustered. Hadenius and Teorell
(2005, 2007), for instance, combine the Freedom House measures for Civil Liberties and
Political Rights as well as the Polity 2 indicator15 to construct an Imputed Polity 2 (iPolity 2)
indicator to capture the level of democracy in a country. In line with this consideration, we
conducted a simple correlation analysis of a large number of potential corruption determinants
in order to exclude variables that are, to a large extent, captured by others. The correlation table
for these variables is reported in BAppendix 3^. A second problem is the availability of data for
12 For a detailed discussion of the CPI, see Seldadyo and de Haan (2006).
13 One of the main challenges that many studies face is the problem of reverse causality. As it is challenging to
identify causes and consequences of corruption, many authors refrain from claiming causation and confine
themselves to presenting correlations (Lambsdorff 2005). Another common challenge is the robustness of results.
Often, the explanatory variable is significant only in simple model specifications and becomes insignificant when
additional control variables are added (Seldadyo and de Haan 2006).
14 Accordingly, we do not consider cultural, religious and historical corruption determinants, such as
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (La Porta et al. 1999; Ali and Isse 2003; Lederman et al. 2005), colonial heritage
(Treisman 2000; Herzfeld and Weiss 2003) or share of Protestants in the population (Treisman 2000; Chang and
Golden 2007).
15 This indicator is part of the second series of the Polity Project containing annual information about the level of
democracy for independent states with a population >500,000 people.
Graph 13 Change in Control of Corruption by country, 1996, 2012. Source: Own calculations
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some of the corruption determinants. Not all data is available for the same group of countries,
especially when considering long time periods. Given the fact that this study considers the
period from 1996 to 2012, this was particularly challenging.
Given these methodological caveats, we limited our analysis to the following control
variables: First, to capture the economic corruption determinants, we include a measure of
economic freedom and openness to trade. The literature finds that restrictions on economic
freedom through state interventions increase the discretionary power of public officials and
thereby the possibilities for rent-seeking. Second, a higher degree of unrestricted openness to
international trade leads to a higher level of competition, which in turn reduces rents that can
be extracted by public officials (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Treisman 2000; Ali and Isse 2003;
Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Gurgur and Shah 2014; Elbahnasawy and Revier 2012).
We also include a measure of the domestic availability and reliance on natural resources,
commonly described as the resource curse. The argument follows that the abundance of natural
resources gives opportunities for rent seeking through, for example, state companies or the
allocation of exploitation rights (Leite and Weidmann 1999; Ades and Di Tella 1999; Herzfeld
and Weiss 2003; Elbahnasawy and Revier 2012).
Capturing the socioeconomic determinants, we included a measure of income per capita
(Treisman 2000; Brunetti and Weder 2003; Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Chang and
Golden 2007; Brown et al. 2011). Income serves as a powerful proxy for those aspects that are
often associated with the classic modernisation argument best expressed by Lipset’s (1963) Political
Man. This prototype of an active citizen engages with other individuals in collective action to
actively shape and control the state when the levels of income, education and urbanisation increase.
Under polity and governance determinants, we understand the different political features of
a state that define its regime and general mode of operation. In line with this definition, we first
included a measure for democracy, which in many studies has been approximated by factors
such as political freedom, political rights, civil liberties or freedom of the media (Brunetti and
Weder 2003; Lederman et al. 2005). The argument follows that democracy allows for higher
degrees of transparency and thus opportunities for citizens to monitor state activities
(Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Paldam 2002). Similarly, other authors argue that
Graph 14 Control of Corruption Model. Source: Own graph. Based onMungiu-Pippidi et al’s (2011) Control of
Corruption model
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democracies are characterised by stronger institutional learning and institutional checks and
balances (Treisman 2000; Lederman et al. 2005; Chang and Golden 2007). Second, we
included a measure for foreign aid. However, this determinant’s impact on corruption is more
ambiguous. Tavares (2003) finds that foreign aid decreases corruption, hypothesising that first,
donor conditionality might force receiving governments to reduce the discretion of their public
officials; and second, that aid might help to fill finance gaps for public wages and thus make
public employees less dependent on corrupt transactions. In contrast, Ali and Isse (2003) find a
positive correlation between foreign aid and corruption, arguing that the transferability of aid
might cause an inflation of the public sector.16
Graph 15 shows the resulting composition of the empirical model.17
Financial Disclosure In-law Effort and Control of Corruption
To examine whether the introduction of comprehensive FD systems reduces national corrup-
tion levels, we employed a fixed-effects panel data analysis using annual data from 1996 to
2012. Furthermore, following the rationale of Rousso and Steves (2007)—that policies’ effect
on anticorruption is felt only after some time—we ran several model specifications, including
different lags of FD in-law effort, to check whether our indicator is significant in explaining
changes in COC. In our analysis, we focussed on the impact and significance of our variables
rather than directly interpreting the estimated coefficients. The logic behind this is that
interpreting numerical results might be misleading given the abstract nature of most variables.
As a robustness check, we drew on the Heritage Foundation’s FFC measure. The regression
equation for the fixed-effects panel data model is the following:
Control of corruptionit ¼ αi þ β1FD inlaw effortit− j−β2Oil rents as % of GDPit
−β3Net ODA as % of GNIit þ β4Economic freedomit þ β5Democracyit
þ β6GNI per capita PPPit þ eit
16 Due to its nature, our main explanatory variable, FD in-law effort, captures only the de jure dimension of FD.
However, the mere existence of laws and regulations does not guarantee that they will be enforced. Accordingly,
the inclusion of a measure for a country’s level of rule of law could potentially fulfill an important complemen-
tary function. Such a measure could serve as a proxy to capture the state’s de facto capacity to effectively enforce
FD laws and regulations. However, the only existing indicator for rule of law that has a sufficiently large country
coverage is one of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by the WB, which was at the same time the
source for our dependent variable COC. According to Langbein and Knack (2010), the inclusion of a left-hand
and a right-hand variable, both taken from the WGIs, would compromise the model’s validity. The authors
convincingly criticise the construction of the six WGIs, arguing that they indistinguishably measure the same
latent and broad concept of good government and that they Bdo not discriminate usefully among different aspects
of governance^ (2010: 353). The authors claim that the definitions of the WGIs strongly overlap, leading to
conceptual tautologies. A correlation of 0.92 between the COC and rule of law variables taken from the WGIs
seems to lend support to their criticism. In order to not put the validity of our results at risk, we decided not to
include the WGI’s rule of law indicator.
17 A more detailed explanation of the variables included in our analysis is available in BAppendix 4^. Summary
statistics of all variables are presented in BAppendix 5^.
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Performing all necessary tests,18 we found that our model suffers from groupwise
heteroscedasticity, cross-sectional correlation and autocorrelation. Therefore, considering the
structure of our data, where the number of countries included in our sample is greater than
number of years covered, we calculated our estimations by applying panel-corrected standard
errors (PCSE), controlling for autocorrelation of order 1, and including a dummy variable for
every country in our sample. Interestingly, when plotting the two dependent variables together,
a considerable number of observations of FFC clustered at the values 1, 3, 5 and 7.19 Dummy
variables were added to control for this phenomenon. We present a scatterplot showing the
clusters in Graph 17 in BAppendix 6^.
Considering that FD in-law effort and GNI per capita PPP are variables that presumably
always increase over time, it was relevant to check whether these variables were subject to a
unit root problem. To corroborate this hypothesis, we performed an augmented Dickey–Fuller
test with different lags. The results were not conclusive, and we could not observe a systematic
pattern allowing us to reject or confirm the trend hypothesis. We considered two solutions for
addressing this potential problem. The first consisted of adding a trend variable.20 The second
solution was to use first-difference estimators.21 We did not obtain a significant result for the
latter specification (see BAppendix 7^).
Table 1 presents results for different specifications of the model and the robustness check.
When turning to model specification 1.1, we observe that our main explanatory variable not
only had a positive sign, but it was also statistically significant. In other words, an increase in
FD in-law efforts is positively associated with an increase in COC 1 year after expansion of the
FD system. Our indicator, however, was not significant when turning to models 1.2 and 1.3.
This may indicate that the corruption-reducing effect vanishes in the second year. From a
18 Hausman specification test (1978), Greene’s (2000) modified Wald statistic test, Frees’ (1995) test of cross-
sectional independence and Wooldridge’s (2002) autocorrelation test.
19 A request to the Heritage Foundation for an explanation for the systematic clustering of certain units at specific
values remained unanswered.
20 See Cameron (2005) for a more detailed discussion of the effects of adding a trend variable to an ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression.
21 A detailed description of this method is available at http://people.duke.edu/~rnau/411diff.htm.
Graph 15 Control of Corruption (COC) and its determinants. Source: Own graph. Based on Mungiu-Pippidi,
et al's (2011) Control of Corruption model
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technical perspective, this may be explained by the collinearity between the different lags of
the FD in-law efforts variable. However, from a systemic point of view, this observation could
potentially be explained by the scandalising effect of large public corruption affairs. Such
scandals often force political elites to engage in publicly visible anticorruption reforms with
new laws and regulations. However, given the ostensible brevity of the corruption-reducing
Table 1 Effects of financial disclosure (FD) in-law effort on national corruption levels: panel fixed-effects















0.189** 0.125 0.124 0.090 0.038 −0.019
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.108) (0.107) (0.107)
FD in-law effort
(t-2)
0.032 0.006 0.206* 0.129





Oil rents as % of
GDP
0.002 0.002 0.003 −0.013** −0.010* −0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Net ODA as % of
GNI
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Economic
freedom
0.003*** 0.003** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Democracy
(iPolity 2)
0.054*** 0.061*** 0.056*** −0.013 −0.024 −0.013
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020)
GNI per capita
(PPP)
0.020** 0.017** 0.019** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
d1 −1.600*** −1.567*** −1.542***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.052)
d3 0.030 0.073* 0.117***
(0.043) (0.041) (0.043)
d5 0.699*** 0.636*** 0.484***
(0.073) (0.082) (0.092)
d7 0.458*** 0.442** 0.196
(0.162) (0.194) (0.235)
Trend −0.021*** −0.019*** −0.021*** −0.026*** −0.025*** −0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 2.056*** 2.051*** 1.981*** 2.770*** 2.601*** 2.428***
(0.159) (0.156) (0.183) (0.334) (0.343) (0.413)
Observations 1304 1227 1148 1304 1227 1148
R2 0.920 0.925 0.931 0.883 0.889 0.900
Correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) reported in parentheses. Country dummies are not displayed
ODA official development assistance,GDP gross domestic product, GNI gross national income, PPP purchasing
power parity, FFC Freedom from Corruption
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
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effect, it might well be that the short-term decrease in corruption levels does not stem from the
reforms but from the scandals themselves, as they cause public officials to adopt a more
cautious behavior vis-à-vis corrupt transactions for a limited time.
The scandalising effect hypothesis seems to lose its validity on examination of models 2.2
and 2.3 of the robustness check. In this case, we observed positive and significant results for
lags 2 and 3 of our indicator, as well as an intensification of the corruption-reducing effect of
expanding FD systems. Thus, an increase in FD in-law efforts seems to be positively correlated
with an increase in the capacity of a country to control for corruption (measured by FFC).
Taking both models together (COC and FFC), the results provide tentative support to both the
idea that new policies require some time to have an impact, and to our hypothesis that the
introduction of comprehensive FD systems reduces national corruption levels.
Taking a look at the other variables, we observe a positive, albeit not significant, effect
between oil rents as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) and COC. Our robustness
check, on the other hand, shows the expected negative and significant relationship between oil
rents as a percentage of GDP and FFC. Against our expectations, ODA as a percentage of GNI
has a positive and significant impact in models 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, which is, however, in line with
findings of authors such as Tavares (2003) and Okada and Samreth (2012). For economic
freedom, we observed the predicted positive and highly significant relationship across all
models. Confirming our expectations, democracy is statistically significant and positively
associated with the capacity of a country to control for corruption in models 1.1, 1.2 and
1.3. The robustness checks do not yield the same results and show a negative, albeit
nonsignificant, relationship. Finally, we observed that for all models, GNI per capita (PPP)
is positively and significantly associated with a country’s capacity to combat corruption. This
provides evidence for the positive relationship between COC and FFC on the one hand and the
aspects that are often associated with Lipset’s classic modernisation argument (e.g. income
education, urbanisation, etc.) on the other.
In order to check whether the impact of FD in-law effort on COC varies with
different levels of other corruption determinants, we included two interaction terms in
our model. We chose those variables that we believe have a varying relationship with
the impact of FD laws and regulations. Thus, we included interaction terms for FD in-
law effort with democracy and GNI per capita (PPP), respectively. For the democracy
interaction term, we expected to observe a negative relationship. This was based on the
assumption that established democracies have more institutionalised checks and bal-
ances that ensure a high level of COC. Thus, the stronger the democratic institutions in
a country, the smaller will be the additional positive effect of FD laws and regulations
on the COC. Likewise, for the GDP per capita (PPP) interaction term, we expected to
observe a negative relationship. Highly developed countries are normally characterised
by high levels of COC. Accordingly, expansion of the FD system in such countries
would probably only have additional marginal effects on COC. In other words, the
more developed a country, the smaller the increase in FD in-law efforts’ effect to
increase a country’s capacity to control for corruption.
Table 2 presents results comparing model 1.1 (t-1) with the aforementioned interaction
terms. As expected, coefficients of both interaction terms are negative but not significant.
Interestingly, in both models, the effect of the lagged FD in-law effort variable increases in
magnitude yet remains significant only in the model including the GNI per capita (PPP)
interaction term. For the remaining control variables, the results presented in Table 2 continue
to be consistent both in terms of sign and significance when compared with the base model
Opening Public Officials’ Coffers 457
1.1. Once more, our estimations provided tentative evidence that an increase in FD in-law
efforts is positively associated with an increase in COC after some time.22
22 In the descriptive statistics in section three, we observed that the expansion of FD laws and regulations and the
decrease in corruption was particularly strong for those countries that found themselves in the various stages of
EU association. To test for this effect, we constructed a variable that captures the degree of EU association for
each country. A value of 0 was attached if there is no association with the EU and the highest value of 5 if the
country is an EU member state. The values of 1, 2, 3 and 4 capture the various intermediate stages, such as being
party to an association agreement with the EU or having applied for full membership. Based on the assumption
that an increasing cultural, political and legal proximity to the EU has a positive effect on corruption levels, we
expected to observe a positive relationship. The results for this model specification are reported in BAppendix 8^.
Presumably due to the high collinearity between association with the EU and GNI per capita (PPP) variables, we
observed slightly less robust results in comparison with the basic model. The Association with EU variable itself
is highly significant in the base model, whereas FD in-law effort loses some significance. However, most of the
other variables showed similar results as the basic model.
Table 2 Effects of financial disclosure (FD) in-law effort on national corruption levels: panel fixed effects
models, including lag and interactions terms (1996–2012 data)
Model 1.1 COC Model 1.1a COC Model 1.1b COC
FD in-law effort (t-1) 0.189** 0.242 0.288**
(0.078) (0.217) (0.114)
Oil rents as % of GDP 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Net ODA as % of GNI 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Economic freedom 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Democracy (iPolity 2) 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.054***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
GNI per capita, PPP 0.020** 0.020** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
FD in-law effort (t-1)* iPolity 2 −0.007
(0.029)
FD in-law effort (t-1) * GNI per capita PPP −0.011
(0.009)
Trend −0.021*** −0.021*** −0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 2.056*** 2.057*** 2.052***
(0.159) (0.158) (0.157)
Observations 1304 1304 1304
R2 0.920 0.920 0.921
Panel-data-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Country dummies are not displayed
GDP gross domestic product, ODA official development assistance, GNI gross national income, PPP purchasing
power parity, FFC Freedom from Corruption
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
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We also ran model 1.1 (t-1) for different subsamples, clustering countries by income groups
and regions according to the WB 2012 classification. The results were not as robust as those
presented in Table 2, as the calculated coefficients for our main explanatory variable and for
some controlling variables lost significance. This could be partly explained by the considerably
smaller number of countries grouped in each subsample. The results for this analysis are
available in BAppendixes 10 and 11^.
In sum, when comparing results between the base model and the robustness check, we
observed consistent robust results in terms of significance and expected sign of the estimated
coefficients. Except for ODA as a percentage of GNI, all of our control variables follow the
predicted relationship with COC and FFC. Overall, we obtained compelling positive and
significant results when considering a time dimension by adding time lags. This supports the
rationale that certain public policies require some time before their effects are measurable and
provides tentative evidence to confirm our initial hypothesis that the introduction of compre-
hensive FD systems reduces national corruption levels.
Limitations
Despite obtaining robust results across various model specifications, we acknowledge that there are
potential limitations and caveats to the findings presented here. First, we cannot exclude a reverse
causality problem. There is a risk that FD systems do not cause a change in national levels of COC,
but in fact the situation is vice versa. For instance, it is possible that only the high-income countries
that already have high levels of COC implement strong FD systems. Similarly, one could argue
that the introduction of FD regulation in low-income countries where corruption is rampant is due to
donor pressure. However, the descriptive statistics in section 6 illustrate that, independent of the
region or the income classification,most countries in our sample have expanded their FD systems. In
fact, as middle-income countries witnessed the largest expansion, the assumption of low levels of
corruption or donor pressure, as driver behind FD system expansions, can be party dismissed.
Moreover, our finding that COC is significantly correlated with the values of FD in-law effort of
previous years limits the threat of reverse causality. It is hard to imagine that present levels of COC
could cause previous levels of FD in-law effort.
Second, our estimates could suffer from an omitted-variable bias. Civil society, for instance,
may play a significant role in combating corruption. Countries with a strong citizenry have
additional surveillance mechanisms to control public officials. Limitations of data availability
did not allow us to control for this variable. However, following Lipset’s modernisation theory,
we believe the effects of this variable and its relationship with COC are sufficiently captured
when including GDP per capita.
Third, our sample might suffer from a selection bias, as the countries’ selection was not
random. There is an over-representation of Eastern European and Central Asia and Sub-Saharan
African countries, whereas other regions are underrepresented. This might bias the estimates
through characteristics that are especially present among European and African countries.
Fourth, despite the WB’s claim that data collection for the PAM data sets followed a
Brigorous and systematic approach^ (WB 2013b: 5) with accuracy and relevance checks, we
cannot exclude that measurement errors were made that would consequently weaken the
validity of our FD in-law effort. To minimise this risk, we went back to country-level data
sets and checked them for inconsistencies and gaps. For this process, we also drew on the
support of WB experts involved in the PAM initiative.
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Finally, it is important to note that despite the robust results we obtained in our model
specifications, we are not making a claim for a causal relationship between an increase in FD
in-law efforts and an increase in COC. Nevertheless, we claim to have discovered a robust
positive correlation, regardless of its moderate magnitude.
Conclusions
Despite the growing global popularity of anticorruption instruments and policies in recent
years, little is known about their true effectiveness. To contribute to filing this research gap
with new quantitative evidence and in order to answer the question of whether FD laws and
regulations have an impact on national corruption levels, we constructed the very first index
that captures a country’s FD in-law efforts based on WB data.
The analysis of this indicator yields that almost all countries in the sample have experienced
a sharp increase in FD laws and regulations between 1996 and 2012, independent of their level
of development or region. Remarkably, we observed the smallest increase for high- and low-
income countries. This allowed us to relativise the assumption that especially countries that
already have low levels of corruption or countries that experience donor pressure implement
extensive FD systems.
Using our index as the explanatory variable, we tested the relationship between corruption levels
and FD regulation in a panel fixed-effects model. This model showed that almost all of the control
variables, except for ODA as a percentage of GNI, follow the predicted relationship with COC.
Following the assumption that FD laws and regulationsmight only unfold their anticorruption effect
after time, we included lagged modifications of the FD in-law effort into the model and find that an
expansion of the FD system has a positive and significant effect on COC over time.
From a policy perspective, these results must be taken with a grain of salt, as judgments
about the real magnitude of the effect are difficult to make. As much as it is challenging to
define the meaning of a 1-unit increase in democracy, it is difficult to describe the meaning of a
1-unit increase in economic freedom. In contrast, a change in the indicator for FD in-law effort
is much easier to quantify, as it is based on a clearly defined set of actionable governance
indicators that can provide policymakers with clear micro-level guidance on where gaps in the
FD system exist and accordingly in which areas their FD system could be strengthened.
Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that all the corruption determinants analysed in this
paper can only claim to have a small effect on COC. This shows that anticorruption strategies
must be thought of at a holistic, societal level, in line with the assumptions of the equilibrium
model. Policymakers will struggle to register success in their fight against corruption if they
rely solely on improving their FD in-law efforts score.
We have shown that FD systems are one factor that can help explain national levels of
COC. However, there are many opportunities for future research, as we have not fully used all
analytical possibilities offered by our FD in-law effort indicator. First, we have not analysed in
detail the single subcomponents of the indicator, such as monitoring and oversight or public
access to information in order to identify whether single components play a more important
role in anticorruption.23 Second, we concentrated on highly aggregated measures of corruption
and did not take into account single, disaggregated components to see whether we could
observe a larger impact on them. An interesting ally to explore is, for example, the impact of
23 A preliminary analysis of the components is presented in Appendix 11.
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FD systems on petty corruption, exemplified by bribery data. Researchers could draw on data
on bribery experiences derived from the Eurobarometer, Latinobarometer and Afrobarometer.
Another interesting relationship is the connection between FD systems and trust in the
government, following the assumption that comprehensive FD systems increase people’s trust
in the government’s actions. To answer this question, researchers could draw own measures of
trust in the government, such as the OECD’s Trust in Government indicator or the World
Economic Forum’s Public Trust in Politicians.
Graph 16 Public Accountability Mechanism (PAM) coverage of regional groups. Source: World Bank 2013
Table 3 List of countries covered by the Public Accountability Mechanism (PAM)
List of countries covered by the PAM
Albania Angola Argentina Armenia
Azerbaijan Bangladesh Benin Bolivia
Bosnia Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Bulgaria
Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Congo Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep. Croatia Czech Republic Dominican Republic
Estonia Ethiopia Fiji France
Gambia, The Georgia Germany Ghana
Guinea Guyana Honduras India
Indonesia Italy Japan Jordan
Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyz Republic Lao PDR
Latvia Lithuania Macedonia, FYR Madagascar
Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius
Mexico Moldova Mongolia Montenegro
Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nepal
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
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Table 3 (continued)
List of countries covered by the PAM
Niger Nigeria Norway Pakistan
Palau Solomon Islands South Africa Sri Lanka
Taiwan, China Tajikistan Tanzania Timor-Leste
Tonga Tunisia Turkey Papua New Guinea
Philippines Poland Romania Russian Federation
Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone Slovak Republic
Slovenia Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom
United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu
Vietnam Zambia Zimbabwe

































0.1615 −0.2243 −0.2749 1
Democracy
(iPolity2)
0.2921 −0.2931 −0.2708 0.535 1
Press
freedom
−0.1836 0.2555 0.2142 −0.5744 −0.8498 1
Indepence
judiciary




0.1682 0.0468 −0.4804 0.4356 0.5343 −0.5535 0.4642 1
FD financial disclosure, GDP gross domestic product, ODA official development assistance, GNP gross national
product, PPP purchasing power parity
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Table 5 Description of variables





measures the FD in-law effort
of a country. The value
ranges from 0 to 1, where the
variable takes a value of 0
when no regulations are in
place for any of the features
of the FD framework.
Conversely, the indicator
takes the value of 0 when no
regulation is in place for any
of the features of the FD
framework. Each of the five
subcomponents of financial
disclosure, namely, (i) disclo-
sure items, (ii) filling
frequency, (iii) sanctions, (iv)
monitoring and oversight and
(v) public access to declara-






This indicator measures Bthe
extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, as
well as capture of the state by
elites and private interests^
(Kaufmann et al. 2006, p. 4).
The indicator has been
rescaled from 0 to 10, where
0 is a country with no COC











Perceptions Index (CPI). The
CPI is based on a 10-point
scale in which a score of 10
indicates very little corrup-
tion




Oil rents as % of
GDP
Difference between the value of
crude oil production at world
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Table 5 (continued)
Variable Definition Year Source
Net official
development aid
received as % of
GNI
The sum of Bdisbursements of
loans made on concessional
terms and grants by official




by non-DAC countries to
promote 1996–2012 eco-
nomic development and wel-







recalculated using 9 out of
the 10 specific
subcomponents used by the
Heritage Foundation to
construct this index. FOC
was not considered. The
subcomponents are: business
freedom, property rights and
labour freedom.
1996–2012 QOG Standard Data Set 2015:
http://qog.pol.gu.se/
data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata
Democracy Measured by the iPolity 2
Indicator. This indicator
averages Freedom House’s
Civil Liberties and Political
Rights and Polity 2. Scale
ranges from 0 to 10, where 0
is least democratic and 10
most democratic. BThe
imputed version has imputed
values for countries where
data on Polity is missing by
regressing Polity on the
average Freedom House
measure^ (QOG)








BGNI per capita (formerly GNP
per capita) is the gross
national income, converted to
US dollars using the World
Bank Atlas method and
divided by the midyear
population^ (World Bank).





FD financial disclosure, FFC Freedom from Corruption, QOG, GDP gross domestic product, GNI gross
national income
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Appendix 5
Table 6 Statistical summary
Variable Observations Mean SD Min Max Year
Explanatory variable
Financial disclosure in-law effort 1530 0.277 0.261 0 0.93 1996–2012
Dependent variables
Control of Corruption 1498 4.426 1.560 0.88 9.64 1996–2012
Freedom from corruption 1402 3.487 1.732 0.4 9.1 1996–2012
Control variables
Oil rents as % of GDP 1513 2.629 8.343 0 70.638 1996–2012
Net official development aid received as % of
GNI
1513 6.116 8.213 -0.253 75.788 1996–2012
Revised Economic Freedom Index 1402 54.514 14.229 2.5 90 1996–2012
Democracy 1504 6.685 2.625 0.25 10 1996–2012
GNI per capita on, PPP 1505 8.710 10.295 0.317 63.738 1996–2012
GDP gross domestic product, GNI gross national income, GNP gross national product, PPP purchasing power
parity, SD standard deviation
Appendix 6
Graph 17 Two-way scatter: Control of Corruption (COC) and Freedom from Corruption (FFC). Source: Own
calculations
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Table 7 Table outputs comparing results: correcting for the unit root problem with first differences
Effects of FD in-law effort on national corruption levels: correcting the unit root problem
Model 1 COC Model 1.1 COC trend Model 1.2 COC 1st diff
FD in-law effort −0.032 0.097
(0.083) (0.087)
FD in-law effort (t-1) −0.122*
(0.066)
Oil rents as % of GDP 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Net ODA as % of GNI 0.007*** 0.005** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Economic freedom 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Democracy (iPolity 2) 0.047*** 0.057*** 0.044***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
GNI per capita, PPP 0.003 0.024***
(0.006) (0.008)




Constant 1.950*** 2.036*** 1.970***
(0.173) (0.166) (0.156)
Observations 1377 1377 1301
R2 0.920 0.921 0.933
Correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) reported in parentheses. Country dummies are not displayed
FD financial disclosure, GDP gross domestic product, ODA official development assistance, GNI gross national
income, PPP purchasing power parity, COC Control of Corruption
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
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Appendix 8
Table 8 Output table including Association with European Union (EU)
















0.141* 0.087 0.088 0.064 0.004 −0.061
(0.083) (0.081) (0.082) (0.107) (0.111) (0.110)
FD in-law effort
(t-2)
0.010 −0.012 0.188 0.109





Oil rents as % of
GDP
0.003 0.002 0.003 −0.013** −0.010* −0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Net ODA as % of
GNI
0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Economic
freedom
0.003*** 0.003** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Democracy
(iPolity 2)
0.050*** 0.057*** 0.053*** −0.015 −0.028 −0.017
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020)
Association with
EU
0.124*** 0.119*** 0.108*** 0.067 0.101* 0.124**
(0.036) (0.038) (0.036) (0.052) (0.055) (0.056)
GNI per capita,
PPP
0.013* 0.011 0.014* 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.048***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
d1 −1.599*** −1.566*** −1.541***
(0.049) (0.050) (0.051)
d3 0.033 0.078* 0.123***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
d5 0.706*** 0.642*** 0.491***
(0.074) (0.083) (0.094)
d7 0.467*** 0.453** 0.208
(0.166) (0.200) (0.244)
Trend −0.020*** −0.019*** −0.020*** −0.026*** −0.024*** −0.025***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant 2.083*** 2.072*** 2.011*** 2.781*** 2.613*** 2.451***
(0.162) (0.162) (0.189) (0.326) (0.330) (0.394)
Observations 1304 1227 1148 1304 1227 1148
R2 0.920 0.926 0.931 0.883 0.891 0.902
Correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) reported in parentheses. Country dummies are not displayed
FD financial disclosure, GDP gross domestic product, ODA official development assistance, GNI gross national
income, PPP purchasing power parity, COC Control of Corruption, FFC Freedom from Corruption
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
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Appendix 9
Table 9 Output table comparing results by income groups




Model 1.2 COC lower
middle income






0.128 0.036 0.251** 0.209
(0.117) (0.177) (0.120) (0.170)
Oil rents as %
of GDP
0.081 0.008 −0.001 0.000
(0.145) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008)
Net ODA as %
of GNI
0.010*** 0.004 0.005 0.148
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.306)
Economic
freedom
0.004* 0.002* 0.005*** −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Democracy
(iPolity 2)
0.030* 0.051** 0.095** 0.179***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.039) (0.042)
GNI per capita,
PPP
−0.067 0.174*** 0.068*** −0.013
(0.130) (0.034) (0.017) (0.016)
Trend −0.015 −0.053*** −0.042*** 0.004
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019)
Constant 1.537*** 3.982*** 2.017*** 8.268***
(0.463) (0.307) (0.200) (0.871)
Observations 334 376 324 270
R2 0.794 0.802 0.886 0.937
Panel-data-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Country dummies are not displayed
FD financial disclosure, GDP gross domestic product, ODA official development assistance, GNI gross national
income, PPP purchasing power parity, COC Control of Corruption
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
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Appendix 10
Table 10 Output table comparing results by regional groups































−0.120 0.036 −0.004 0.031 0.178 −0.036 0.200
(0.877) (0.260) (0.114) (0.248) (1.023) (1.447) (0.138)
Oil rents as
% of GDP
−0.052 −0.026** 0.002 −0.022 −0.270*** 0.401* 0.003
(0.038) (0.013) (0.004) (0.024) (0.095) (0.221) (0.004)
Net ODA as
% of GNI
. 0.022*** −0.000 −0.003 0.060 0.007 0.010***
. (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.045) (0.052) (0.003)
Economic
freedom
−0.009 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 −0.008 0.003 0.005**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.002)
Democracy
(iPolity 2)
−0.152 0.166*** 0.087*** 0.053 −0.031 −0.014 0.068***




−0.028 0.137** 0.017 0.056** 0.437*** 0.131** 0.021
(0.020) (0.068) (0.013) (0.024) (0.166) (0.065) (0.027)
Trend −0.001 −0.073*** 0.004 −0.024* −0.186*** −0.058*** −0.022***
(0.024) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.049) (0.017) (0.006)
Constant 11.550*** 4.672*** 2.206*** 5.915*** 4.557*** 2.853*** 1.902***
(2.696) (0.391) (0.203) (0.599) (1.225) (0.459) (0.228)
Observations 112 125 387 128 48 80 424
R2 0.890 0.873
Feasible generalised least squares errors reported in parentheses for models 1.1, 1.2, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6. Panel-data-
corrected standard errors reported in parentheses for models 1.3 and 1.7. Country dummies are not displayed
FD financial disclosure, GDP gross domestic product, ODA official development assistance, GNI gross national
income, PPP purchasing power parity, COC Control of Corruption
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
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Table 11 Output table comparing results by components of financial disclosure (FD)
Effects of FD in-law effort on national corruption levels: panel fixed-effects models, including lag and













FD in-law effort (t-1) 0.189**
(0.078)
Disclosure items (t-1) −0.032
(0.054)












Oil rents as % of GDP 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Net ODA as % of
GNI
0.007*** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Economic freedom 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Democracy (iPolity 2) 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
GNI per capita, PPP 0.020** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Trend −0.021*** −0.019*** −0.019*** −0.019*** −0.019*** −0.019***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 2.056*** 2.043*** 2.035*** 2.036*** 2.035*** 2.038***
(0.159) (0.162) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164) (0.164)
Observations 1304 1296 1296 1296 1296 1296
R2 0.920 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.929
Panel-data-corrected standard errors reported in parentheses. Country dummies are not displayed. The nonsig-
nificant results of the FD components are potentially due to the nature of our indicator itself, which causes a
natural clustering of the observations. This behaviour inflates the calculated standard errors of our estimated
coefficients. Illustrations evidencing the previous are available in Graph 18 in BAppendix 12^
FD financial disclosure, GDP gross domestic product, ODA official development assistance, GNI gross national
income, PPP purchasing power parity, COC Control of Corruption
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
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Appendix 12
Graph 18 Two-way scatter: Control of Corruption (COC) and components of financial disclosure (FD),
1996-2012. Source: Own calculations
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Graph 18 (continued.)
472 G. Vargas, D. Schlutz
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and repro-
duction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, Competition, and Corruption. American Economic Review, 89(4), 982–
993. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.982.
Ali, A. M., & Isse, H. S. (2003). Determinants of Economic Corruption: A Cross-Country Comparison. Cato
Journal, 22(3), 449–466.
Anderson, J. H., & Gray, C. W. (2006). Anticorruption in transition 3: Who is Succeeding… and Why?. World
Bank Publications.
Andvig, J. C., Fjeldstad, O. H., Amundsen, I., & Søreide, T. (2000). Research on Corruption. A policy oriented
survey. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. Retrieved from http://www.icgg.org/downloads/contribution07_
andvig.pdf.
Bauhr, M., & Grimes, M. (2014). Indignation or Resignation: The Implications of Transparency for Societal
Accountability. Governance, 27(2), 291–320. doi:10.1111/gove.12033.
Besley, T. (2007). Principled agents?: The political economy of good government. The Lindahl lectures. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bovens, M. (2005). Public Accountability. In E. Ferlie, L. E. Lynn, & C. Pollitt (Eds.), The Oxford
handbook of public management (pp. 182–208). Oxford: Oxford University Press (Oxford
handbooks).
Brewer, G. A., Choi, Y., & Walker, R. M. (2007). Accountability, corruption and government effectiveness in Asia: an
exploration of World Bank governance indicators. International Public Management Review, 8(2), 204–225.
Brown, D. S., Touchton, M., &Whitford, A. (2011). Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: a Cross-
national Comparison. World Development, 39(9), 1516–1529. doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.02.006.
Brunetti, A., &Weder, B. (2003). A free press is bad news for corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 87(7–8),
1801–1824. doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00186-4.
Burdescu, R., Reid, G., Trapnell, S., Barnes, D., Kwapinski, M., & Berger, T. (2010). Salient Issues in Income
and Asset Disclosure Systems : Lessons Learned from the Field in Preventing Conflict of Interest and
Combating Illicit Enrichment. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/handle/10986/11083.
Burdescu, R., Reid, G. J., Trapnell, S. E., & Barnes, D. W. (2010). Income and Asset Disclosure Systems:
Establishing Good Governance through Accountability. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from
https://www.openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/10175.
Cameron, S. (2005). Econometrics. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education.
Chang, E. C. C., & Golden, M. A. (2007). Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption. British Journal
of Political Science, 37(01), 115–137. doi:10.1017/S0007123407000063.
de Sousa, L. (2010). anticorruption agencies: between empowerment and irrelevance. Crime, Law and Social
Change, 53(1), 5–22. doi:10.1007/s10611-009-9211-3.
DeMars, C. (2010). Item response theory. Series in understanding statistics. Measurement. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Demmke, C., Bovens, M., Henökl, T., Moilanen, T. (2008). Regulating conflicts of interest for holders of public
office in the European Union: A comparative study of the rules and standards of professional ethics for the
holders of public office in the EU-27 and EU institutions. Maastricht: European Institute of Public
Administration. Retrieved from http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/regulating-conflicts-of-interest-for-holders-of-
public-office-in-the-european-union-pbQX3008703/.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2010). Disclosure by Politicians. American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(2), 179–209. doi:10.1257/app.2.2.179.
Elbahnasawy, N. G., & Revier, C. F. (2012). The Determinants of Corruption: Cross-Country-Panel-Data
Analysis. The Developing Economies, 50(4), 311–333. doi:10.1111/j.1746-1049.2012.00177.x.
Frees, E. W. (1995). Assessing cross-sectional correlation in panel data. Journal of Econometrics, 69(2), 393–
414. doi:10.1016/0304-4076(94)01658-M.
Greene, W. H. (2000). Econometric analysis. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Gurgur, T., & Shah, A. (2014). Localization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandoras Box? Annals of Economics
and Finance, 15(1), 109–136.
Opening Public Officials’ Coffers 473
Hadenius, A., Teorell, J. (2005). Assessing alternative indices of democracy (Committee on Concepts and
Methods Working Paper Series). Mexico City: International political science association. Retrieved from
http://www.concepts-methods.org/Files/WorkingPaper/PC%206%20Hadenius%20Teorell.pdf.
Hadenius, A., & Teorell, J. (2007). Pathways from Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, 18(1), 143–157.
doi:10.1353/jod.2007.0009.
Hanna, R., Bishop, S., Nadel, S., Scheffler, G, Durlacher, K. (2011). The effectiveness of anticorruption policy:
what has worked, what hasn’t, and what we don’t know: a systematic review. London: EPPI-Centre, Social
Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. Retrieved from http://www.u4.
no/recommended-reading/the-effectiveness-of-anticorruption-policy-what-has-worked-what-hasn-t-and-
what-we-don-t-know-a-systematic-review/.
Hausman, J. A. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6), 1251–1271.
Herzfeld, T., & Weiss, C. (2003). Corruption and legal (in) effectiveness: an empirical investigation. European
Journal of Political Economy, 19(3), 621–632. doi:10.1016/S0176-2680(03)00018-1.
Islam, R. (2006). Does more Transparency go Along with Better Governance? Economics and Politics, 18(2),
121–167. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00166.x.
Johnsøn, J., Taxell, N., & Zaum, D. (2012). Mapping evidence gaps in anticorruption: Assessing the state of the
operationally relevant evidence on donors’ actions and approaches to reducing corruption. (U4 Issue No. 7):
Chr. Michelsen Institute. Retrieved from http://www.u4.no/publications/mapping-evidence-gaps-in-
anticorruption-assessing-the-state-of-the-operationally-relevant-evidence-on-donors-actions-and-
approaches-to-reducing-corruption/.
Kaufmann, D. (1997). Corruption: the facts. Foreign Policy, 107, 114–131. doi:10.2307/1149337.
Kaufmann, D., Mehrez, G., & Gurgur, T. (2002). Voice or Public Sector Management? An Empirical
Investigation of Determinants of Public Sector Performance based on a Survey of Public Officials. SSRN
Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.316865.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., Growth, W., & Institute, W. B. (2006). Governance Matters V:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996–2005. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/1740479-
1150402582357/2661829-1158008871017/gov_matters_5_no_annex.pdf.
Klitgaard, R. E. (1988). Controlling corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kunicová, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2005). Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as
Constraints on Corruption. British Journal of Political Science, 35(04), 573–606.
doi:10.1017/S0007123405000311.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The quality of government. Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 15(1), 222–279. doi:10.1093/jleo/15.1.222.
Lambsdorff, J. (2005). Consequences and causes of corruption: What do we know from a cross-section of
countries? (No. 05). Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe, 34. Retrieved from
http://www.wiwi.uni-passau.de/fileadmin/dokumente/lehrstuehle/lambsdorff/downloads/Corr_Review.pdf.
Langbein, L., & Knack, S. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Six, One, or None? Journal of
Development Studies, 46(2), 350–370. doi:10.1080/00220380902952399.
Ledeneva, A. V. (2013). A critique of the global corruption paradigm. In J. Kubik & A. Lynch (Eds.),
Postcommunism from within. Social justice, mobilization, and hegemony (pp. 296–332). New York: New
York University Press.
Lederman, D., Loayza, N. V., & Soares, R. R. (2005). Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions
Matter. Economics and Politics, 17(1), 1–35. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2005.00145.x.
Leite, C. A., & Weidmann, J. (1999). Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption, and economic
growth: IMF working Paper No. 99/85. Retrieved from Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources,
Corruption, and Economic Growth.
Lipset, S. M. (1963). Political man: The social bases of politics. London: Mercury books.
Messick, R. (2009). Income and asset declarations: Issues to consider in developing a disclosure regime (U4
Issue): Chr. Michelsen Institute, 6. Retrieved from http://www.u4.no/publications/income-and-assets-
declarations-issues-to-consider-in-developing-a-disclosure-regime/
Mukherjee, R., Gokcekus, O. (2006). Officials’ asset declaration laws: do they prevent corruption? Global
corruption report 2006. Ed. Robin Hodess and Toby Wolfe., 2006. 325–328. Retrived from: http://works.
bepress.com/omer_gokcekus/36.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. et al. (2011). Contextual choices in fighting corruption: Lessons learned:
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Report 4/2011. Retrieved from
http://www.againstcorruption.eu/reports/contextual-choices-in-fighting-corruption-lessons-learned/.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A., Martínez, R., Kukutschka, B., Dadasov, R. (2014). Quantitative report on causes of
performance and stagnation in the global fight against corruption. Retrieved from http://anticorrp.
eu/publications/quantitative-report-on-causes/.
474 G. Vargas, D. Schlutz
OECD. (2011). Asset declarations for public officials: A tool to prevent corruption (Fighting corruption in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia). Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from www.oecd.
org/corruption/antibribery/47489446.pdf.
Okada, K., & Samreth, S. (2012). The effect of foreign aid on corruption: a quantile regression approach.
Economics Letters, 115(2), 240–243. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.051.
Paldam, M. (2002). The cross-country pattern of corruption: economics, culture and the seesaw dynamics.
European Journal of Political Economy, 18(2), 215–240. doi:10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00078-2.
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail-Systemic Corruption as a
Collective Action Problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x.
Reid, G. J. (2009). Actionable Governance Indicators: Concepts and Measurements. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/286304-
1235411288968/AGIConceptsMeasurement.pdf.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences, and reform. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, B. (2011). anticorruption: the indirect ‘big bang’ approach. Review of International Political Economy,
18(2), 228–250. doi:10.1080/09692291003607834.
Rousso, A., & Steves, F. (2007). The effectiveness of anticorruption programs: preliminary evidence
from the post-communist transition countries. In: Rose-Ackerman, S. (Eds.). International hand-
book on the economics of corruption (pp. 247–277). Cheltenham: Edward ElgarSeldadyo, H., de
Haan, J. (2006). The Determinants of Corruption: A Literature Survey and New Evidence. Turku:
Paper Prepared for the 2006 EPCS Conference, Turku, Finland, 20–23 April 2006. Retrieved from
http://www.congress.utu.fi/epcs2006/docs/D1_seldadyo.pdf.
Seldadyo, H., & de Hann, J. (2006). The determinants of corruption: a literature survey and new evidence. Paper
prepared for the 2006 EPCS Conference, Turku, Finland. Retrieved from: http://projects.iq.harvard.
edu/files/gov2126/files/seldadyo_determinants_corruption.pdf. Accessed 30 June 2016.
Tavares, J. (2003). Does foreign aid corrupt? Economics Letters, 79(1), 99–106. doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00293-8.
Tavares, S. (2007). Do Freedom of Information Laws Decrease Corruption? Rochester Institute of technology.
MPRA Paper No. 3560. Retrieved from http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3560/.
Treisman, D. (2000). The Causes of Corruption: a Cross-National Study. Journal of Public Economics, 76(3),
399–457. doi:10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00092-4.
Ugur M., Dasgupta N. (2011). Evidence on the economic growth impacts of corruption in low-income countries
and beyond: a systematic review. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of
Education, University of London. Retrieved from http://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/Default.aspx?tabid=3108.
Vickerman, R. (2009). Financial disclosure in three African countries: All bark and little bite. African Security
Review, 18(3), 80–87. doi:10.1080/10246029.2009.9627545.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press.
World Bank. (2012). Public Office, Private Interests: Accountability through Income and Asset Disclosure.
Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from https://star.worldbank.org/star/publication/public-office-
private-interests.
World Bank. (2013a). Income and Asset Disclosure: Case Study Illustrations. Directions in Development.
Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from doi:10.1596/978-0-8213-9796-1.
World Bank. (2013b). Public Accountability Mechanism (PAM) Initiative. Methodology Paper (World Bank
Governance and Public Sector Group). Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-1343934891414/8787489-
1361546839123/PAMmethodology_25Feb2013.pdf.
World Bank. (2013c). Financial Disclosure Systems. Declarations of Interests, Income, and Assets. A Background
Primer (World Bank Public Sector and Governance Group). Washington D.C.: World Bank. Retrieved from
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/Resources/285741-
1343934891414/8787489-1361546839123/PAMmethodology_25Feb2013.pdf.
Opening Public Officials’ Coffers 475
